Caring for Monsters by Kirwin, Peter
Caring for Monsters
PETER KIRWIN
There are five overlapping ethical objections to the creation of chimera: 
1) Unnaturalness; 2) Species Integrity; 3) Moral Taboo; 4) Environmental 
Risk and 5) Chimera Welfare.  This chapter will briefly outline the first 
four, before arguing that considerations of chimera welfare provides us 
with a strong reason against the creation of some, but not all, chimera.  
According to the argument from unnaturalness it is simply not our place 
to intervene in the basic mechanisms of nature.  Critics of this view often 
challenge the coherence of any distinction between nature and human 
convention and the implicit assumption that nature is perfect as it is . 
Furthermore, it is often argued that, ad absurdum, the argument leads 
us to condemn as immoral the damning of rivers and the ploughing of 
fields.
Sometimes considered a narrower interpretation of the unnaturalness 
argument, the argument from species integrity representks a realist 
position in which species are natural kinds whose distinction from 
each other we are under a moral imperative to respect.  Against this 
view it is often argued that the idea of species is nothing more than a 
convenient system of classification  and that anyway, the mere existence 
of something does not imply a moral imperative to maintain it .
The argument from moral taboo appeals to a common and intuitive 
disgust at the creation of chimeras.  Such moral taboos, on this account, 
serve important social functions with taboos against incest, for example, 
guaranteeing a healthy level of genetic diversity in the community .  In 
response critics counter that few (if any) taboos remain constant across 
time and cultures, taboos against crossing species boundaries being no 
exception.  Many past (e.g. Ancient Egyptian) and some present (e.g 
Hinduism) religions contain, or contained, gods who appear to combine, 
in their form, human elements with those of other species .   
The Environmental Risk argument appeals to consequential considerations 
for the ecosystem and therefore the survival of our species.  In making 
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biological mixtures for which there is no natural precedent we have no 
idea what to expect.  Chimeras may act as half-way houses between 
species for diseases or, breaking out of laboratories, may breed with other 
species and upset the delicate balance of the ecosystem.  Objections to 
the argument centre round the extent to which risk can be minimized 
and the outweighing of such risk by potential benefits .  
 The Chimera Welfare argument thinks experimentation should 
be restricted by obligations, both to existing individuals and to those 
individuals one wants to design and create.  Creating some chimeras is 
wrong because it neglects said obligations. Exactly what obligations 
do we have to existing sentient  individuals?  A good place to start is 
current restrictions, informed consent aside, regarding human test 
subjects.  The “International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects”, published by The Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with 
the World Health Organization (WHO), states four ethical principles 
.  “Respect for persons” calls for the “protection” of “dependent and 
vulnerable” persons “with impaired or diminished autonomy” against 
“harm or abuse” .  “Beneficence” demands that risks be “reasonable” 
compared to “expected benefits ” while “nonmaleficence “proscribes 
the deliberate infliction of harm  on persons ”.  Finally, “distributive 
justice” requires “the equitable distribution of both the burdens and the 
benefits of participation in research ” and that difference in distribution 
be justified by some “morally relevant distinction between persons ”. 
These principles form reasonable restrictions regarding human test 
subjects who are incapable of informed consent.  Indeed, acceptance of 
such principles appears so widespread that even systematic offenders 
against them, such as Nazi scientists, did not openly reject them but 
argued that the principles did not apply because their test subjects were 
sub-human.
The traditional response to the Nazi scientist is to argue that the test 
subjects were indeed members of our own species.  A more radical 
approach, however, is to question the assumption that membership of 
our species is a necessary or sufficient condition to be protected by the 
CIOMS principles.  Why not replace ‘persons’ with ‘sentients’ and extend 
the principles to all sentient creatures?  In taking this line I am adopting 
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Singer’s famous call to extend to other species “the basic principle of 
equality ” understood as “equal consideration of interests ”.  If we 
oppose the restriction of this principle to one race then, Singer argues, 
we must oppose its restriction to one species .  Any attempt to restrict 
its extension to ownership of a particular mental or physical attribute is 
arbitrary because one can always ask, why this attribute and not another 
?  Furthermore, any attempt to restrict extension to human beings faces 
the problem that any characteristic basic enough to include every human 
being will also include many animals .  On the other hand, any attempt 
to choose an attribute that will exclude these animals will also exclude 
many human beings like young infants and severely mentally disabled 
infants or adults .  Singer dismisses out of hand, tying the principle of 
equality to the simple fact of species membership on the grounds that 
this is analogous to tying it to membership of a particular race .  The 
capacity for “suffering” as a necessary and sufficient condition for 
having interests is, for Singer, the only reasonable boundary .
   A large number of those who wish to limit the basic principle of 
equality to our own species do this on the grounds of a special “human 
dignity” not found in other species.  This concept has its roots in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition and is traditionally justified by man’s position 
in the “great chain of being” where he has “dominion” over animals . 
Other justifications include souls, a likeness to God  and Jesus’ Incarnation 
in a human body .  Secular versions of human dignity have their roots 
in Kant’s avowal that only “rational beings” have “unconditional and 
incomparable worth” or dignity because they are capable of moral 
agency .  Unfortunately, modern secular conceptions often never define 
‘human dignity’ , and so leave us wondering why it is not extended to 
animals, or define it in such a way that many arbitrary qualifications are 
needed to avoid the exclusion of infants and severe mental defectives. 
Conceptions of human dignity can detract from animal welfare by either 
implying that, in a conflict of human and animal interests, it is morally 
permissible to favor humans or by suggesting that only human interests 
are morally relevant.        
 Human dignity aside, an alternative response to our position is to 
consider, as does Michael Allen Fox , the moral community in terms of a 
social contract model.  Building upon Kant’s stress on moral agency, Fox 
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argues that moral obligation can only exist within a moral community 
consisting of a series of “mutual guarantees”, “by tacit agreement”, of 
“nonintervention in the self-governing lives of others ”.  However, to 
participate in a mutual guarantee one must be able to understand and 
implement one’s own side of the bargain.  In short, to be the subject of 
moral obligations you must be capable of moral agency.  To be a moral 
agent one must be autonomous which, for Fox, requires not only “critical 
self awareness; the ability to manipulate complex concepts and to use a 
sophisticated language ” but also “the capacity to reflect, plan, deliberate, 
choose, and accept responsibility for acting ”.  Not being autonomous, 
animals are incapable of moral agency and thus are not subjects of moral 
obligation.  Given its necessity to participation in any contract and its 
description in terms of a cluster of features, Fox’s stipulation of moral 
agency appears to avoid Singer’s usual charge of arbitrariness.
Its seems, however, that Fox’s argument still sets the bar for membership 
of the moral community so high that many normal infants, severely 
mentally defective infants and adults are denied membership.  Fox’s 
reply is that normal infants are brought under the protection of the 
moral community because they have autonomy in “latency ”.  It is briefly 
suggested that severely mentally disabled adults and infants should be 
protected because this provides a form of insurance for moral agents 
should they, through illness or injury, lose their own autonomy .  Putting 
aside, for charity, problems with the moral relevance of potential in 
normal infants, the idea of insurance works well for adults who have lost 
their autonomy through accident or illness.  However, Fox needs to find 
some other way of justifying moral obligation towards severely mentally 
deficient infants which have no ‘latent’ autonomy and whose protection 
is not prudential for moral agents: a forty-year-old man is not afraid 
of becoming a mentally deficient four-year-old.  Fox’s answer is two-
fold.  Firstly it is argued that our intuition in favour of moral preference 
for members of our immediate family justifies moral preference for our 
“human family ”.  For additional support, Fox adopts John Passmore’s 
account of a “chain of love and concern ” that extends down the 
generations and includes the “places, institutions and forms of activity ” 
that constitute our day-to-day existence.  Though not explicitly put, the 
thought seems to be that moral agents care for their descendents who 
may turn out to be mentally defective infants, therefore the protection of 
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mentally defective infants is in fact another form of prudence.  
The first part of this argument will not wash.  Fox needs to assume that 
the original intuition is based on our biological relation to immediate 
family members, in which case the intuition would also justify racism. 
However, the intuition is based upon the relationships built with family 
members (natural or adopted) and thus does not extend to strangers from 
our own species.  Furthermore, the intuition justifies moral preference 
regarding superogatory acts as opposed to basic moral obligations .  It 
will justify buying family members, but not strangers, birthday cards but 
will not justify stealing from strangers.  Fox’s second argument needs to 
take account of the fact that, given the progress of biotechnology, one of 
my distant descendents may be genetically altered so that moral agents 
do not consider the resulting chimera wholly human.  Given this, it 
seems that concern for one’s descendents must in fact lead us to extend 
“the basic principle of equality ” to all sentient creatures.
Having established our moral obligations to existing organisms the 
question arises as to what obligations we have to organisms that will 
come into existence as a result of our design and creation.  In answer 
to this I would like to adopt a slightly altered  version of Bernard 
Rollin’s “Principle of Conservation” which states that it is not morally 
permissible to bring into existence a creature whose expected quality of 
life (as a result of the developmental modification) is likely to be lower 
than is normal for the host’s parent stock .  If an alteration in functional 
capacities lowers quality of life below this point it is most likely due to the 
frustration of telos.  Telos is an originally Aristotelian concept, according 
to which each species of animal has a natural way of life consisting of 
a series of ends or activities, some of which are shared by other species 
and some of which are species specific .  Individual organisms are 
instinctively driven to fulfil these, with success in the enterprise creating 
contentment and failure creating suffering.  If our previous argument 
about extending “the basic principle of equality” is accepted then the 
Principle of Conservation applies to all possible sentient creations.  
 Before moving on let us deal briefly with some objections that 
may be made to The Principle of Conservation.  One objection is that a 
creature must exist before it can be harmed or benefited and so the act of 
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creation itself does neither good nor evil to the organism in question . It 
may be responded that this objection rests upon the broad assumption 
that all moral wrongs involve wronging individuals when there are 
certain things, such as destroying the last instance of a rare orchid, which 
we consider wrong independently of harm to individuals .  Against 
this it will likely be countered that such ‘victimless wrongs’ still derive 
their wrongness from effects upon individuals.  If I destroy the orchid 
many people will lose the chance to experience its beauty while my 
contribution to the lack of biodiversity harms the environment and thus 
all individuals living in it.  To truly silence the objector it is tempting to 
argue intuitively using a thought experiment in which, when crushing the 
orchid, I am the last sentient individual in the universe.  Such refutation 
is not necessary, however, for the key problem with this objection is its 
implicit assumption that actions can only be wrong due to effects upon 
“identifiable individuals ”.  Parfit , however, recognises that such a view 
would commit us to regarding many future actions, such as setting a 
bomb under St. Salvator’s quad to go off in fifty years, as morally neutral 
because they don’t harm or benefit “identifiable individuals ”.  Many of 
the victims are unidentifiable because their identities will be the result 
of decisions made between now and then but it seems absurd to say that 
they cannot therefore be harmed.     
It may also be objected that measuring quality of life to any useful 
degree involves an understanding of the consciousness involved and, 
as such, is obviously impossible when that consciousness does not yet 
exist.  In answer to this I take what Degrazia calls an objective view of 
wellbeing according to which judgment of the future organism’s quality 
of life is based upon her chances of achieving “species-typical levels of 
mental and physical functioning ”.  This approach maintains a subjective 
element, however, insofar as the degree to which the future organism is 
likely meet these standards gives us some idea how good or bad life will 
be from its own perspective.    
      
Accepting the Principle for the Conservation of Welfare, it follows that, 
when our normative principles are combined with the definition of 
chimera reached in the first chapter, we will judge the moral permissibility 
of creating chimeras on a case-by-case basis.  Chimeras resulting from 
intervention in the embryo (pre-differentiation) will be judged by the 
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New Principle for the Conservation of Welfare and in doing so we must 
understand three crucial points.  Firstly, not all new functional capacities 
change telos; secondly, those which do not may either help, hinder, or not 
effect fulfilment of the existing telos and thirdly, relative to physiology, 
changes in the telos may either preserve or diminish welfare.  That some 
alterations in arrangement do not change telos is intuitively obvious 
given that telos is psychologically determined and, for example, whether 
or not an individual has wings will not affect her underlying psychology. 
Such a change would not change telos but does provide us with an 
example of a non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would 
help the organism fulfil its current telos.  Accomplishing one’s ends or 
goals would be a lot easier if one had wings and the same would seem 
to apply to individuals with, say, sonar or night vision.  An example of a 
non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement that would not affect the 
organism’s ability to fulfil its telos might be an ‘omnicow’: a cow who 
can also digest meat.  Such an alteration would have no effect upon telos 
because, while it does not interfere with the normal activities of a cow, 
neither does it give the omnicow an advantage in fulfilling her ends. 
On the other hand, one non-telos-changing alteration in arrangement 
that would probably hinder the fulfilment of telos might be a dog with 
a shark’s tail in place of its two back legs.  This ‘sharog’ would seriously 
struggle to accomplish its ends upon land and, though the tail might help 
him swim a little faster, this is of little consequence, there being nothing 
in an average dog’s telos that requires swimming.  Those deviations in a 
chimera from the standard functional arrangement of its species which 
produce a fundamentally different underlying psychology may change 
the telos for good or bad.  A change in telos is a change for good insofar as 
something has been added to the original telos and it is ensured, perhaps 
through simultaneous changes in physical arrangement of the organism, 
that the organism is capable of fulfilling the new aspects of its telos.  To 
use a concrete example, intervention in a cat embryo to create a catman 
with the desire, in addition to a normal cat telos, to communicate with 
language is permissible insofar as the catman’s design includes whatever 
physical augmentation is necessary to use a complex language.  
Regarding chimeras resulting from xenografts of large parts of the brain in 
post-differentiated embryos or adults, these will be judged by our version 
of the four CIOMS principles which implicitly include considerations 
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of telos.  To use a concrete example, let us examine the quail-chicken 
chimeras referred to in chapter one.  This case appears to violate at least 
half of our principles for research on those incapable of consent.  The 
exploitation of the chickens is contrary to both ‘distributive justice’ and 
the principle of ‘beneficience’ because there is no equal distribution of 
the burdens and benefits of participation and the chickens involved are 
put at great risk while appearing to gain nothing from the experiments. 
Whether their creation is contrary to ‘respect for sentients’ and ‘non-
malefience’ will depend on whether the quail chicken’s biology allows it 
to fulfil whatever quail ends it is conscious of .  Given that chicken and 
quail physiology appear broadly similar one would guess that it would 
be able to fulfil these but, pending an exact comparison, we reserve final 
judgment.    
Creating a chim
era from a brain xenograft, we might think, would be permissible if it made 
the host far more intelligent.  Here we should be cautious, however, and 
remember that intelligence by itself does not increase welfare and may 
actually reduce it.  Not only can intelligence increase suffering through 
an increased knowledge of one’s situation but also, as we have seen, by 
adding something to the telos which the body is incapable of satisfying. 
If a xenograft designed to increase intelligence changes the telos of 
the chimera in question from the parent stock, the same rule applies 
as to the humanzee created by developmental modification.  Telos may 
only be expanded if it is combined with physical augmentation which 
ensures that the new telos can be fulfilled.  If this condition, along with 
our version of the four CIOMS principle, is satisfied then the sentient in 
question could benefit from a brain xenograft and the creation of this 
chimera might be permissible.   
Having established that creation of certain chimeras is wrong, the 
question arises as to how this ‘wrongness’ is to be interpreted.  To one 
extreme we might mean wrong in a strict deontological sense where it 
is always impermissible and no room is allowed for mitigating factors. 
To the other extreme we might mean wrong in a consequentialist sense 
which allows that wrongness to be outweighed by other consequences 
in the pursuit of a greater good or the avoidance of a greater evil.  The 
key question for whatever sense we choose is whether the means can 
ever justify the ends or, to be more specific, whether the creation of such 
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chimeras might be justified if they led to extremely valuable medical 
advances.  There is not space here for a full answer to this question and 
so it will suffice to leave the reader to make up her own mind on this. 
In doing so she should, however, be cautioned that the fact that our 
normative principles centre upon negative duties not to inflict pain and 
suffering does not necessarily imply as a bedrock a Utilitarian system 
which includes positive duties to increase the overall welfare of all 
sentient creatures.         
Our objection from Chimera Welfare argues that we have obligations 
both to existing sentient individuals and those individuals we bring into 
existence by our creation and design.  These obligations are extended 
to all individuals (sentient individuals in the first case) regardless 
of species.  Two sets of principles constitute the content of these 
obligations.  Firstly, our version of the CIOMS principles prohibit, in 
the case of existing sentient creatures, intervention where any benefit 
to the creature is outweighed by its harms and burdens.  Secondly, 
the Principle for the Conservation of Welfare prohibits the creation by 
developmental modification of any chimera whose expected quality of 
life will be lower than that of the host’s parent stock.  Given limitation 
of length, the nature of these prohibitions – whether they are absolute 
and, if not, in what scenarios they might be overridden – is here left to 
the judgment of the reader.        

